AN EXAMINATION OF THE EXEGESIS OF COMPUTATION OF TIME IN PRE-ELECTION AND ELECTION MATTERS IN NIGERIA

Contributor: Dr. S A. T Abubakar

INTRODUCTION

In electoral jurisprudence, time is not a mere procedural formality, it is the lifeblood of the process. The Nigerian legal system has, over the years, developed a reputation for its strict insistence that electoral disputes must not only be resolved justly, but swiftly. In this context, the computation of time assumes a jurisdictional character; once the law prescribes a timeframe, the courts are bound to obey it with mathematical precision, regardless of the equities of any particular case.

This insistence on strictness is not without justification. Election matters, by their nature are sui generis (unique and special). They demand prompt resolution to ensure that justice is not delayed and to preserve the stability of governance and the legitimacy of public office. Yet, it is precisely this rigidity that has generated some of the most complex interpretative questions in Nigerian constitutional law, questions that have compelled our courts to navigate the thin line between legal certainty and substantive justice. In determining pre-election and election matters in Nigeria (unlike regular civil matters), strict compliance with legal timeline is mandatory.

From KALU V. ODILI & ORS^[1] to ANPP & ORS v. GONI & ORS^[2] and, more recently, ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ANOR V. INEC & ORS^[3], the Nigerian judiciary has been called upon time and again to interpret how time should be computed in pre-election and election matters, whether the day the cause of action accrues should be included or excluded in the computation of time or not, when does time begin to run, and whether public holidays, weekends, or even court vacations can extend a statutory deadline. Each decision, in its own way, contributes to the evolving exegesis, of how time is understood, applied, and enforced in our pre-election and election jurisprudence.

This article undertakes a detailed examination of that exegesis. It explores the constitutional, statutory, and procedural frameworks governing the computation of time in election-related matters; analyses the judicial reasoning that has shaped the law; and reflects on the practical and jurisprudential challenges that continue to confront litigants and courts alike. Ultimately, it seeks to illuminate how the Nigerian courts have balanced the imperatives of timeliness with the demands of justice, and whether that balance has, in practice, been sustained.

UNDERSTANDING THE LAWS GUIDING COMPUTATION OF TIME IN PRE-ELECTION AND ELECTION MATTERS

The computation of time in pre-election and election matters in Nigeria is guided by a constellation of constitutional, statutory, and procedural instruments that collectively define both the limits and the flexibility of the law.

At the apex of these laws is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the grundnorm from which all other electoral provisions derive validity. For instance, Section 85 of the Constitution, introduced by the Fourth Alteration, was a deliberate legislative response to the delays that once plagued election petitions. Subsections (5) to (14) stipulate, in clear and mandatory terms, the time within which election petitions and pre-election suits must be filed, heard, and determined. For instance, Section 285(9)^[4] provides that a pre-election matter shall be filed within 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision, or action complained of. Similarly, Section 285(10)^[5] requires that such a matter be determined within 180 days from the date of filing. Thus, with the main intent to foreclose all lingering electoral disputes, the framers of the Constitution inserted an unbending time frame within which same must be conclusively adjudicated.

Pre-election matters, being sui generis, are also guided by the Federal High Court (Pre-Election Practice Directions) 2022. These Directions, issued by the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court pursuant to Section 254 of the Constitution, are designed to ensure expeditious disposal of pre-election matters. They regulate filing, service, and hearing, and in some instances, truncate or refine the time available for procedural steps.

However, while the Constitution and Electoral Act provide substantive boundaries on the computation of in election petitions, the Court has also given judicial interpretation to the provision of the Interpretation Act^[6]. Particularly, section 15(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act, which directs that, where an act is to be done within a specified number of days from a particular event, the day of the event shall be excluded from the computation. Section 18 further clarifies that if the last day of the period falls on a Sunday or public holiday, the act may be done on the next following day that is not such a day. ^[7] However, in OLUWASHOLA ABDULWAHEED JIMMY IDIAGBON V ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS & 2 ORS^[8] (Unreported), where the Claimant had instituted his pre-election suit 15 days after the accrual of the cause of action instead of 14 days stipulated by the Constitution and the Electoral Act. The Court held that the matter was statute-barred and struck it out. The Court considered the provisions of the Interpretation Act, which exclude the date of the event from the computation of time, and the provisions of the Electoral Act, which include the day of the event in the computation of time. The Court juxtaposed the relevant provisions of the Constitution, Electoral Act and the Interpretation Act and noted that “the Constitution used the word ‘date’ as opposed to ‘day’ which is deliberate because a date refers to a specific day of the month in a year identified by a number e.g 15/10/2018 while a day is however a period of 24 hours otherwise known a “Solar Day” it is a time from the sunrise to sunset.” Thus, since the Constitution expressly says “14 days from the date” unlike the Interpretation Act, such a date on which the act or an event happened must be reckoned with and not excluded in computing time in pre-election and election petition matters.

JUDICIAL DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF TIME COMPUTATION

Over the years, Nigerian Courts, particularly the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, have been relentless in defining how time should be computed in electoral disputes.

Perhaps the earliest expression of judicial rigidity on this subject can be traced to KALU V. ODILI^[9], where the Supreme Court held that once a period prescribed by statute has expired, no court has jurisdiction to extend it. That principle has since become axiomatic. Time limits in election matters are not mere procedural guidelines but jurisdictional conditions precedent. In the words of the Court, “When the law prescribes that an act must be done within a certain time, failure to comply is fatal, and no amount of sympathy can revive a right extinguished by time.”

The same sentiment reverberated decades later in ANPP & ORS V. GONI & ORS^[10], where the Supreme Court reiterated that the 14-day window under Section 285(9) of the Constitution begins to run from the date of the event, decision, or action complained of, not from when the complainant became aware of it. In other words, time begins to run, not when a litigant wakes up to his grievance, but when the triggering event occurs. The Court reasoned that allowing subjective interpretation of “knowledge” would undermine the constitutional intent of certainty and finality.

The Court of Appeal in UCHA v. ONWE & ORS^[11] offered another instructive clarification. The issue was whether a pre-election suit filed outside the 14-day window could be saved by arguments of equity or substantial justice. The court held emphatically that time in election matters is jurisdictional; thus, once a matter is filed out of time, it is a dead suit. The court added, with characteristic bluntness, that “a petition filed one minute outside the prescribed period is as worthless as one filed a year too late.” The doctrine of equity, it said, has no role where the Constitution speaks in mandatory terms.

In OKECHUKWU V. INEC^[12], the Court of Appeal addressed another common confusion: whether weekends and public holidays can extend statutory deadlines for election petitions. The Court held that, except where a specific law expressly provides for such exclusion, time runs continuously, without pause for weekends or holidays. The rationale, according to the Court, is that the Constitution itself sets a self-executing timeline, which cannot be suspended by human convenience.

The Court of Appeal, in the case of BALOGUN V. ODUMOSU^[13] where the court held that:

“It must be remembered that traits of all laws affecting election petition tribunal is that of essentiality of time. The Sprit of the Laws is that as much as possible such petitions are given expeditious adjudication to enable the parties know their status”^[14]

The Court further held that:

“The issue of time to complete the filing of all processes relating to the hearing and determination of an election petition was uppermost in the mind of the legislation. The enactment stretches itself further afield to do away with tardiness and waste of time, and endeavoured to constrict the time of doing a particular act within a time framework. In other words it is the intention of the legislators that parties stick strictly to the times stated in the Decree. The court would not aid anyone who decides to sleep only to wake up when it is too late”^[15]

More recently, in ATIKU ABUBAKAR V. INEC & ORS^[16], the Supreme Court revisited the subject in the context of modern election petitions. The Court underscored that the 180-day limit for hearing and determining petitions is immutable and cannot be extended by agreement, adjournment, or even by the inherent powers of the court. Once the clock runs out, jurisdiction evaporates. This decision reinforced the long-standing judicial policy that electoral stability outweighs procedural leniency.

These decisions show the Courts have consistently treated time not as a matter of convenience, but as a constitutional command which gives no indulgence. Thus, in pre-election and election petitions, every second counts.

ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES EMERGING FROM JUDICIAL DECISIONS

From the numerous judicial pronouncements on the computation of time, certain principles have crystallised with remarkable consistency. These principles not only guide legal practitioners and judges in navigating electoral timelines, but also reflect the courts’ evolving philosophy:

1. Time in election and pre-election matters is jurisdictional and mandatory: This has been made clear by plethoral of judicial decisions, time in election litigation goes to the root of the Court’s jurisdiction. Once a case is filed outside the prescribed timeframe, it becomes incompetent and the court becomes functus officio, stripped of the power to entertain it. No plea of substantial justice, no invocation of equity, and no sympathy for inadvertence can cure the defect.
2. Time begins to run from the date of the event, decision or action complained of: This principle dispels any notion that time should start from when a litigant becomes aware of the event. The courts have repeatedly held that the Constitution leaves no room for subjective interpretation. The event itself, not the litigant’s awareness of it, triggers the countdown.
3. Election Timelines are Self-executing and Immune to Extension: The timeframe for hearing petitions cannot be extended by any means, neither judicial discretion, consent of parties, nor the exigencies of the court’s docket can avail litigates extension of time.

While these principles appear straightforward in theory, their application within Nigeria’s complex electoral terrain often reveals the true tension between law and equity, procedure and justice. In BELLO V. YUSUF & ORS^[17] and OYETOLA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS^[18], the apex court reaffirmed that the sanctity of time in electoral matters is tied to the integrity of the process itself. The Court held that the judicial system cannot rewrite the Constitution in the name of substantial justice.

The Federal High Court (Pre-Election Practice Directions, 2022) also reflects this rigidity. Paragraph 2 of the Practice Directions mandates that pre-election cases “shall be given priority and disposed of expeditiously within the period stipulated by the Constitution.” This means the trial courts are not at liberty to extend or condone delays, even when both parties consent, because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement.

The Electoral Act, 2022, particularly Sections 29(5), 134, and 135, provides procedural details on the initiation, hearing, and determination of petitions and pre-election suits. While it mirrors the constitutional imperatives, it also embeds procedural guidelines for compliance.

Perhaps the most complex controversy arises in relation to amendments or substitution of originating processes. Can a process filed within time but later amended outside the constitutional period still be regarded as competent? The courts’ position has been unyielding. In UBOH v. NWAOBOSHI & ORS^[19], the Court of Appeal reiterated that any amendment that introduces new facts, parties, or reliefs after the expiration of the 14-day window renders the action incompetent. The court reasoned that “an amendment cannot relate back to cure a defect in jurisdiction occasioned by lateness.” Similarly, in IFON v. APC & ORS^[20], the Supreme Court cautioned that time-bound actions in electoral litigation cannot be revived through procedural ingenuity, once the statutory period lapses, the court becomes functus officio.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, as it has been noted earlier, the computation of time in pre-election and election matters is not a mere technical ritual; it is the lifeblood of electoral adjudication in Nigeria. The courts, over time, have drawn an unambiguous line between procedural flexibility and constitutional certainty, consistently affirming that timelines in electoral disputes are jurisdictional, mandatory, and self-executing. Once the window prescribed by the Constitution closes, the hands of the court are tied, and no invocation of equity or plea for substantial justice can reopen it.

This strict approach, though often criticized as harsh, is anchored in sound policy and democratic logic. Elections are time-sensitive by nature; the stability of governance and legitimacy of representation depend on finality and predictability. To allow endless litigation would be to subject the electoral process to perpetual uncertainty, a danger the framers of Section 285 of the Constitution deliberately sought to avoid. As the Supreme Court has reiterated in cases like OYETOLA & ANOR v. INEC & ORS^[21] and BELLO V. YUSUF & ORS^[22], the integrity of democracy rests not just on justice being done, but on its being done within time.

That said, the judiciary has also shown commendable sensitivity in applying these rules. By harmonizing the provisions of the Constitution, Electoral Act, and Interpretation Act, the courts have carved out a framework that is both principled and pragmatic. They have resisted the temptation to bend constitutional commands under the weight of sympathy, yet they have applied interpretative guidance to ensure that no litigant is unfairly deprived of access to justice through ambiguity.

Ultimately, the exegesis of time computation in electoral jurisprudence reflects a mature and evolving democratic consciousness, one that values certainty as much as fairness. For legal practitioners, the message is clear: in election litigation, time is not just of the essence, it is of the substance. Every second counts, and once the clock runs out, not even the strongest of cases can be revived.

REFERENCE

1. (1992) LPELR-1653(SC) ↑
2. (2012) LPELR-7830(SC) ↑
3. (2023) LPELR-61556(SC) ↑
4. CFRN ↑
5. Ibid ↑
6. Cap I23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 ↑
7. Interpretation Act ↑
8. KWS/378/2018. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. ↑
9. (Supra) ↑
10. (2012) LPELR-7830(SC) ↑
11. (2011) LPELR-8085(SC) ↑
12. (2014) LPELR-22891(CA) ↑
13. (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 592) 590 pp. 596-597 ↑
14. Ibid. See also P.D.P. v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (pt. 1323) 205 at 252 where the Supreme Court, Pa Adekeye, J.S.C. held that the main objective of section 285 of the constitution is to remedy or remove the mischief (which is the delay in election matters) which hitherto created a cogwheel in the steady progress of election matters in litigation. I think it is a very good innovation which is all out to remove question of any delay whether caused by the deliberate act of the parties or by the non challance of all other bodies, authorities, including the courts of law, legal representatives (counsel) for the parties etc. I therefore find it difficult to fault this vibrant and revolutionary section of the Constitution. ↑
15. Ibid P.97, paras B-C ↑
16. (2023) LPELR-61556(SC) ↑
17. (2019) LPELR-47918(SC) ↑
18. (2023) LPELR-60392(SC) ↑
19. (2019) LPELR-48313(CA) ↑
20. (2019) LPELR-48521(CA) ↑
21. Supra ↑
22. Supra ↑